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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
-

licationof

Petitioner,

Affirmation in Reply and further
support of Article 78 Petition

-againstTINA M . STANFORD,
CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE
BOARD OF PAROLE,

fudexNo. -

Respondent.
For Judgment Pursuant to Ali icle 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

MARTHA RAYNER, an attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of New York,
hereby affmns the following under penalty of pe1jmy:
1.

I am a law professor at Fordham University School of Law and associated with the law

school 's clinical law office, Lincoln Square Legal Services, fuc., 150 West 62nd Street, N ew
York, NY 10023.
2.

I represent Petitioner

I submit this affinnation in reply to Respondent's

Januaiy 14, 2022 Answer and Memorandum in Suppo1i and in fmiher support of the Amended
Petition.

RESPONDENT RELIES ON INAPPLICABLE LAW TO SUPPORT ITS CONTENTION
THAT THE BOARD MET ITS OBLIGATION TO EXPLAIN DEPARTURE FROM
LOW COMPAS SCORES
1. fu response to Petitioner's ai·gument that the Boai·d failed to explain its depaii ure from

low COMP AS scores, Respondent relies on an inapplicab le po1i ion of
the regulation as well as caselaw predating the adoption of the co1Tect po1i ion of the

1
1 o f 16

INDEX NO.

FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2022 05:02 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 88

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2022

FUSL000139

regulation. 1 See NYSCEF No. 66 at 7–8, Memorandum of Law in Support of

Respondent’s Answer [hereinafter “Resp. Memo.”] (discussing the 2011 amendments to
the Executive Law requiring the Board to consider “risk and needs” principles, but
ignoring the 2017 amendment to the applicable regulation, 9 N.Y.C.R.R §8002.2(a)).
2. Respondent inaccurately asserts that because the Board considered the COMPAS risk and
needs assessment tool, it satisfied its obligation under 9 NYCRR §8002.2(a). Respondent
overlooks the fact that the same regulation, as amended in 2017, requires the Board to
“specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it
departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure” when it departs from
the COMPAS. 9 NYCRR §8002.2(a). 2 Respondent cites no authority indicating that the
Board can forego this obligation. Indeed, Respondent relies exclusively on authority
predating the 2017 amendment to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a). 3
3. Petitioner does not assert, as Respondent claims, that “the COMPAS mandate[s] a
particular result” or that the Board was required to give the COMPAS “dispositive
weight.” NYSCEF No. 66 at 7–8, Resp. Memo. Rather, Petitioner urges the Court to
grant a de novo review based on the Board’s failure to comply with its own regulation.
See Voii v. Stanford, (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 2020) (noting that the Board’s parole
denial based on the social welfare and deprecate standards did not “excuse the Board
from complying with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a) and ordering a de novo review).

1

“Low” and “unlikely” scores on the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment indicate positive scores. See NYSCEF
No. 39 at 1, 2020 COMPAS.
2
The excerpted language was added to the regulation in 2017, three years before the parole review at issue in the
instant proceeding. N.Y. Reg., Sept. 27, 2017.
3
Even though Gonzalvo v. Stanford, cited by Respondent, was decided after 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a) was amended,
the denial decision at issue predated the amendment and the decision does not address the Board’s obligation to
explain departure from low COMPAS scores. 153 A.D.3d 1021 (3d Dep’t 2017).
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4. fu addition, rather than respond substantively to Petitioner 's persuasive authority in
support, Respondent makes the specious claim that Petitioner's citations to unreported
cases "betrays the weakness" of Petitioner 's argument. NYSCEF No. 66 at 9 n.5, Resp.
Memo.; NYSCEF No. 58, Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition at 4-6 [hereinafter
"Pet. Memo."]. The unrepoited decisions were made by comts of coordinate jurisdiction
to this Comt and their unpublished status does not diminish their persuasive authority.
Tellingly, Respondent makes no argument nor cites authority disputing the merits of the
six decisions, all of which suppo1t Petitioner's argument regarding the Board's regulato1y
obligation to explain departures from COMPAS. See NYSCEF No. 66 at 7- 8, Resp.
Memo.; see also NYSCEF No. 58 at 3-6, Pet. Memo.
5. To the extent Respondent now argues that the disciplinaiy ticket Petitioner received
within 24 months of the 2020 review explains the Boai·d 's depai·ture from the COMPAS,
this is belied by the record. See NYSCEF No. 66 at 8, Resp. Memo. (arguing the
"COMPAS repo1t suggests that Petitioner remains violent."). The Boai·d explicitly found

incai·cerated. At the 2020 interview, the Boai·d stated: "I think it's obvious that your
Inisconduct is not high." NYSCEF No. 36 at 24, 2020 Pai·ole fute1v iew and Decision
[hereinafter "2020 Transcript"]. The Boai·d recognized that "it was not nonnal for
-

1111

last violent ticket was in 1990.

to catch that ticket" and that

Id. at 17. Moreover, the Boai·d did not cite to the recent ticket as a reason for the denial
of pai·ole or as a reason for depai·ture from all the other positive COMPAS scores. See id.
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at 30 (the Board's decision regarding the COMPAS noted only "the low scores indicated
therein.").
6. fudeed, although the COMPAS states that

received 1 ticket in the 24

months prior to the review for " fighting," it also states that

did not "appear

to have notable disciplinaiy issues." NYSCEF No. 39 at 4-5, 2020 COMPAS. 11
-

received low scores in the 11 other categories. Id. at 1. Thus, both the

COMP AS itself and the Boai·d's assessment thereof ai·e critically different from
Respondent's characterization of the COMPAS in its pleadings.
7. Therefore, based on the record facts and as argued by Petitioner, the denial should be
annulled, and a de novo review granted. NYSCEF No. 58. at 3- 5, Pet. Memo.
RESPONDENT IMPROPERLY DEEMS THE ISSUE OF PENAL PHILOSOPHY
UNPRESERVED AND MISCHARACTERIZES THE FACTUAL RECORD
8. First, the ai·gument, both as to the penal philosophy expressed by the prosecutor and the
sentencing court, and that likely expressed by the voluminous opposition material, was
raised and addressed in the administrative appeal. NYSCEF No. 74 at 21 , Petitioner
Administrative Appeal [hereinafter "Admin. App."] Ground Four of the administrative
appeal brief, titled "The Pai·ole Boai·d 's Decision Constitutes an Unauthorized
Resentencing," raises this issue, namely that the Board relied on penal philosophy.
Although

a pro se petitioner, did not expressly use the tenn of a.ii "penal

philosophy," he ai·gued that "the Boai·d is not tasked with the 'establishment of penal
policy "' (emphasis added) and relied extensively on the Appellate Division decision in
King v. New York State Div. ofParole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1993), ajfd, 83 N.Y.2d 788
(1994). NYSCEF No. 74 at 22, Admin. App. Consideration and reliance on penal
philosophy is also preserved by

claim, in the administrative appeal brief,
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th at "the board took on the personae of the sentencing court and chose to re-sentence l l
-

to a sentence that th ey felt was more appropriate to fit the crimes he was

convicted of. " Id. As
"effectively resentenced

argued in his administrative appeal, the Board
to an additional tenn of incarceration, oveITiding

the intent of the legislature while disregarding the ve1y rationale behind parole." Id. at
2 1.

9. Moreover, the administrative appeal decision recognized and addressed this argument.
The Board 's administrative appeal decision affinning denial of parole found that contraiy
to Petitioner 's contention, there was no "p enal philosophy discussed." NYSCEF N o. 75
at 3, Decision on Administrative Appeal [hereinafter "App. Dec."]. Thus, Respondent's
claim that the issue of penal philosophy was not raised in the administrative appeal is
wrong .
10. Second, as to the m erits, the Board raised the penal philosophy of the sentencing judge
during the interview, notwithstanding Respondent 's claim that it was raised in response
to something

stated. NYSCEF No. 66 at 10, Resp . Mem o. The Board's

discussion of th e sentencing judge's penal philosophy did, as a matter of placement,
precede a discussion of a potential 440 motion .4 But, it was gratuitous for the Boai·d to
raise the sentencing comi 's personal penal philosophy. It was after info1mingl l
-

th at he would not face the sain e judge again should he file a post-conviction

motion that the Board needlessly recited the sentencing j udge's penal philosophy. This
inte1jection of penal philosophy was not relevant to th e 440 motion since, according to
th e Boai·d, th e sentencing judge had passed away. NYSCEF N o. 66 at 10, Resp. Memo.

4

Respondent inc~
that"had not been successful" in a 440 motion. NYSCEF No. 66 at
10, Resp. Memo.. . . . . . has not filed a motion pw-suant to Section 440 of the Criminal Procedw-e Law.

5
5 of

16

INDEX NO.

!FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 01/26/2022 05:02 PM)
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 88

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/26/2022

FUSL000139

Rather than conveying the futility of post-conviction relief, as Respondent claims, the
Board 's inclusion of the sentencing judge's recommendation is better characterized as
conveying the futility of

ever being granted parole. See NYSCEF No. 36

at 12, 2020 Transcript ("[the judge] said that you should never be released and his last
day in office, he was going to make sure he wrote to the parole board.").
11. fu addition, Respondent ignores the penal philosophy expressed in the recommendation
letters from the prosecutor and judge, which as Respondent concedes, the Board is
required to consider. See generally NYSCEF No. 72, Letters from Petitioner 's Counsel,
ADAs, and Trial Judge [hereinafter "Letters"]; see also N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i (c)(A).
Petitioner has now had the chance to read these strongly worded letters, in which the
retired sentencing judge writes to the Board directing them to "never, never, never, never
parole"

NYSCEF No. 72 at 6, Letters. The Board's invocation of the

sentencing judge 's penal philosophy during the inte1v iew and the five letters from the
district attorney and judge convey recommendations based exclusively on their own
personal views of the appropriate punishment. Therefore, the Board considered penal
philosophy by affnmatively raising the sentencing comi's recommendation during the
inte1v iew and failing to disavow the same penal philosophy expressed in later letters from
the judge and DA. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 58 at 9-11 , Pet. Memo.
12. Finally, rather than refute the Board's consideration of penal philosophy, Respondent
argues it is pennitted. See NYSCEF No. 66 at 10, Resp. Memo. Respondent contends
that because today's law requires a life without parole sentence upon conviction of killing
a police officer, this pennits the Board to consider penal philosophy that expresses a
punishment the law requires today. Id. (" .. .to the extent that the Board considered any
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philosophy that Petitioner should never be released, they were considering the wishes of
the society as expressed by the Legislature."). Respondent essentially argues that life
without parole may be functionally imposed by the Board, through repeated denials of
parole, because it is the law today. NYSCEF No. 66 at 10-11, Resp. Memo. ("The
Legislature has spoken clearly: a 'defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole upon conviction of the crime of' killing a police officer. P.L. § 70.70(5)
(incmporating P.L. § 125 .26)"). This displays a profound misunderstanding of the
Board 's power and is fmther evidence of the Board's reliance on penal philosophy.
13. By invoking the sentencing comt's penal philosophy at the inte1v iew, not disavowing the
penal philosophy conveyed in the judge and DA recommendation letters and arguing in
its opposition that the Board was permitted to consider penal philosophy that was
consistent with cun ent sentencing law, Respondent has considered factors outside the
scope of the law. See King, 83 N.Y.2d at 791.
RESPONDENT MISREPRESENTS THE BOARD'S REASONING AND THE FACTUAL
RECORD TO SUPPORT ITS ASSERTION THAT THE BOARD'S DECISION WAS
NOT PREDETERMINED
14. Respondent argues that the Board considered the relevant statuto1y factors, and therefore
could not have predetennined its decision; however, Respondent does not address the
curso1y nature of the Board's assessment, or its consideration of non-statuto1y and highly
prejudicial factors and the impact such consideration had on the Board's decision. See
NYSCEF No. 66 at 9, Resp. Memo.; see also NYSCEF No. 58 at 14-17, Pet. Memo.
15. Respondent now asserts a new rationale for the Board's decision to deny
parole, one which contradicts the Board's analysis during the review and its written
decision. In suppo1t of its altered analysis of

7
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Respondent now contends that "Petitioner's inte1v iew demonstrated that he has not put
this [violent] conduct in the past." NYSCEF No. 66 at 10, Resp. Memo. Respondent
argues that

went "out of his way" to "absolve himself of responsibility,"

and to "label the witnesses against him 'prostitutes."' Id. at 9. While Respondent now
argues why

should have been denied parole, Respondent's position in its

pleadings is divorced from the Board's view in the parole inte1view and resulting
decision-the record. The Board did not cite

alleged failure to accept

responsibility in its decision denying parole. NYSCEF No. 36 at 30, 2020 Transcript. To
the extent the Board "considered"

"claim of innocence," it did not

indicate the effect of that consideration. See id. Fmiher, the Board's decision does not
trial. Id. The Board's decision

mention lack of remorse or witnesses at
notes

most recent disciplinaiy ticket but labels his disciplina1y record

"relatively clean ... despite" that ticket. Id.; see also id. at 23- 24 ("Commissioner
Coppola: I think that Tier II ticket tripped you up. I disagree with that. . .it 's obvious your
misconduct is not high."). The Boai·d's decision primai·ily focuses on
instant offense. See id. at 30- 31. Thus, the record contradicts Respondent's changed
view, first asse1ied in its pleadings in the instant proceeding, that the denial was based on
inability to put "violent conduct in the past." NYSCEF No. 66 at 10,
Resp. Memo.
16. Fmiher, Respondent does not meaningfully dispute that
profile or that the Boai·d considered the high-profile natme of

case is highcase when

denying him parole. Respondent's sole claim regai·ding this issue is that "Petitioner
cannot inject an issue into the interview only to complain that that issue infected his

8
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interview." NYSCEF No. 66 at 9, Resp. Memo. This asse1t ion ignores the fact that the
Board has discussed the publicity associated with

case since his first

parole review in 2012. See NYSCEF No. 48 at 10, 2012 Transcript; see also NYSCEF
No. 58 at 15- 17, Pet. Memo. Similarly, in 2017, it was the Board who first noted that
case was "extremely high profile." NYSCEF No. 50 at 19, 2017
Transcript. In the instant review, the Board resurfaced the subject of the "high profile"
nature of

case near the end of the interview without

mentioning the topic. NYSCEF No. 36 at 24, 2020 Transcript. The 2020 Board opted to
do this while listing the other factors it would consider in its parole decision. Id. It is
injected this topic when the Board

inaccurate for Respondent to claim that

first raised it and has repeatedly done so since 2012. NYSCEF No. 58 at 15- 17, Pet.
Memo. Even assuming arguendo that

injected the topic into the 2020

review, that does not grant the Board license to consider inelevant, non-statuto1y, and
highly prejudicial subject matter in its parole determinations. Id. at 14.
17. Respondent's recharacterization of the Board's 2020 assessment and effo1t to downplay
its consideration of the high-profile nature of

case underscores the fact

that the Board gave curso1y consideration to

release in 2020, despite its

duty to give "genuine consideration to the statuto1y factors." Ferrante v. Stanford, 172
A.D.3d 31, 38 (2d Dep 't 2019); Rossalds v. New York State Div. ofParole, 146, A.D.3d
22, 27 (1st Dep't 2016). Respondent essentially urges the Comt to rnle that if the Board
pays lip-se1v ice to the statuto1y factors in its decision, its actions effectively become
unreviewabl~ven if the record reflects the Board's consideration of prejudicial an d
inelevant material. NYSCEF No. 66 at 9, Resp. Memo. Respondent's position is

9
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untenable and at odds with decisional authority. See Ferrante, 172 A.D.3d at 38;
Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 27; NYSCEF No. 58, at 14–15, Pet. Memo.

PETITIONER’S FACTS ESTABLISHING
BIAS SHOULD BE DEEMED ADMITTED

PERSONAL

18. Respondent’s denial of facts based on a claimed lack of knowledge when Respondent
certainly has such knowledge is improper, and thus such facts should be deemed
admitted. See NYSCEF No. 65 (denying knowledge as to the allegations contained in
paragraphs 61, 62, 73–87, all of which concern

past parole

decisions, job tenure, and failure to comply with court orders). Respondent may not
“close his eyes and ears for the purpose of avoiding knowledge and information.”
Dahlstrom v. Gemunder, 198 N.Y. 449, 454 (1910). Where “the fact alleged is
something the court feels the defendant must know first-hand, one way or the other, a
denial upon information and belief will not do.” Practice Commentary CPLR 3018:3; see
also 84 N.Y. Jur. 2d Pleading § 138 (“Where the defendant has personal knowledge of
the facts alleged, however, a denial based on lack of information or knowledge is
inappropriate.”); Seigel’s New York Practice, 6th Ed. § 221, 532 (“Denials must be made
in good faith.”).
19. The Petition cited to multiple specific instances in which

voted to

deny the release of a person convicted of killing a police officer and provided citations to
supporting documents. See NYSCEF No. 35 at ¶ 73–87, Amended Petition. Yet,
Respondent claimed it did not have “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained.” NYSCEF No. 65 at 3:10, Resp.
Answer. In one instance,

violated a court order which prohibited
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him from sitting on the de novo appearance of a parole applicant—a person convicted of
killing a police officer—after

was found to have wrongfully denied parole

based solely on the nature of his crime. See NYSCEF No. 35 at ¶ 74–81, Amended
Petition. In another cited instance, the Board, by a majority, found that the law required
the release of a parole applicant who was convicted of killing a police officer.
ignoring the law, dissented. See id. at ¶ 82–83; NYSCEF No. 47 at 83, Pet. Ex. 12. Yet,
again, despite Petitioner’s provision of citations and exhibits in support of such facts,
Respondent claimed it did not have sufficient knowledge to answer. NYSCEF No. 65 at
3, Resp. Answer. These are facts known by Respondent. A party may be deemed to
possess personal knowledge of his transactions. Weiskopf v. City of Saratoga Springs,
244 A.D. 417 (3d Dep't 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 269 N.Y. 634 (1936). Respondent
surely possesses knowledge of

voting record. If not through a record search,

then Respondent need only ask
20. When a party has personal knowledge but nevertheless denies the allegation, “the
allegation purportedly denied may be deemed an admission.” Practice Commentary
CPLR 3018:3; see also Gilberg v. Lennon, 193 A.D.2d 646 (2d Dep’t 1993) (“to the
extent the portions of the answer constitute improper denials, they may be deemed
admissions”); see also In re Clement, 132 A.D. 598, 599–600 (3d Dep’t 1909);
Kirschbaum v. Eschmann, 205 N.Y. 127, 131 (1912). See also Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v.
Baiden, 36 N.Y.2d 539, 544 (1975) (“Facts appearing in the movant's papers which the
opposing party does not controvert, may be deemed to be admitted”); Sellitti v. Acrish,
580 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (3d Dep’t 1992). Respondent had an entire month to answer the
amended petition, and over two months since receiving the original petition, well over the
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statutorily allotted 15 days. CPLR §7804(c). Respondent never requested more time to
conduct fact finding. Instead, Respondent simply claims lack of knowledge of facts
within its possession and attacks only the circumstantial evidence of personal bias based
on political affiliation and campaign donations. NYSCEF No. 66 at 12–14, Resp. Memo.
(referring to Petitioner’s claims as “an unseemly investigation” which “rests upon
multiple levels of hearsay”).
21. It is troubling that despite many objective facts establishing personal bias, it appears
Respondent did not attempt to determine if this former commissioner in fact holds such a
bias. In light of Respondent’s improper response to the Petition, Paragraph 10 of the
Answer, those allegations in Paragraphs 61, 62 and 73–88 of the Petition should be
deemed admitted.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PETITIONER REQUESTS AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PURSUANT TO CPLR 7804(H)
22. To the extent that the Court deems Respondent’s inappropriate denials of knowledge
(“DKIs”) effective denials of Petitioner’s allegations, Petitioner requests an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to CPLR 7804(h). See infra ¶18-20. Respondent’s obfuscation of basic
facts within its possession frustrates the adversarial process and efficient adjudication.
See NYSCEF No. 35 at ¶ 73–88, Amended Petition (alleging, inter alia, bias on the part
of

based on his decisional history as a parole commissioner). If

Respondent’s DKIs are deemed denials, an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 7804(h) is
warranted as it is “impossible to determine the matter upon the submitted papers alone.”
Ames v. Johnston, 169 A.D.2d 84, 85 (3d Dep’t 1991); See Lakeshore Nursing Home v.
Axelrod, 181 A.D.2d 333, 340 (3d Dep’t 1995) (ordering a hearing pursuant to CPLR
7804(h) and noting that “…article 78 proceedings are summary in nature and require

12
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resolution of factual disputes at a hearing ... "). Respondent should be compelled to
produce -

to testify at a hearing to pennit the Comt to detennine the relevant

facts of bias .

THE BOARD HAD ACCESS TO A RECORD DEMONSTRATING
LACK OF HONESTY AND INTEGRITY
23.

was constitutionally entitled to have the parole decision detennined by
unbiased commissioners. A Petitioner "is constitutionally entitled to unprej udiced
decision-making by an administrative agency . It follows that a detennination based not
on a dispassionate review of facts but on a body's prejudgment or biased evaluation must
be set aside." Warder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State ofN Y. , 53 N.Y.2d 186, 197
was not afforded his right to

(1981) (internal citations omitted) .
unprej udiced decision-making.

24. Respondent contended in its administrative appeal decision that -

is entitled to

the presumption of honesty and integrity. NYSCEF N o. 75 at 3, App. Dec. In response
to this claim, Petitioner has now put fo1w ard a range of facts rebutting this presumption .
Setting aside evidence of -

political affiliations, Petitioner has brought fo1ward

direct evidence that establishes fo1mer Commissioner 's personal bias and establishes that,
as to persons convicted of killing police officers, -

does not act with honesty and

integrity. Yet, rather than investigate Petitioner 's allegations , Respondent claims such
facts are not pait of the record.
25. The Board cites to one case to suppo1t its argument that it did not have any record of
histo1y of bias when it made its administrative decision . See
NYSCEF Doc. 66 at 12 (citing Yarbough v. Franco , 95 N.Y.2d 342, 347 (2000)).
N otwithstan ding the inapplicability of this case to the present facts, the citation provided

13
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stands for the proposition that the administrative agency must have a record "upon which
to weigh the [] pa1ty's excuse an d potential defense." Yarbough v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d
342, 347 (2000). Though the facts of-

bias were not put fo1ward

byll

at his parole interview, where counsel is not pennitted to appear, nor in his pro

se appeal, at which he had no access to such facts, Respondent ce1iainly had a record of
the facts put fo1ward in the Petition. The facts are purely Respondent's facts. It is
therefore e1rnneous to claim that the Board did not have a record of-

histo1y

of bias.
26. Respondent detennined at the administrative appeal level, documented in its decision,
that -

was deserving of the "presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches

to Judges and administrative fact-finders." NYSCEF No. 75 at 3, Resp. Ex. I.
Respondent cannot now claim that it did not have access to the record when Respondent
raised the ve1y issue of honesty and integrity in its own administrative decision. The fact
that the Board ignored its own record facts of bias, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, should not preclude this Comi from detennining whether Respondent's
reliance on the presumption of honesty and integrity has been overcome by the facts
alleged in the Amended Petition.
27. Petitioner acknowledges that in order to allege bias, it "must set fo1ih a factual
demonstration suppo1iing the allegation as well as prove that the administrative outcome
flowed from it." Sunnen v. Admin. Rev. Ed.for Pro. Med. Conduct, 244 A.D.2d 790,
791- 92 (1997). Petitioner has satisfied both requirements. As to the first requirement,
Petitioner has set fo1ih ample facts demonstrating

histo1y of bias

towards parole applicants with convictions for killing police officers. The second prong
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naturally flows from the first, in th at - bias maps directly on to
crime of conviction. Petitioner has satisfied his burden with out any substantive response
or denial from Respondent.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the Petition together with the relief sought should be granted, in
addition to any additional relief the Comi deems just and proper.

Dated : N ew York, New York
January 26, 2022

Mariha Rayner, Esq.
Clinical Associate Professor of law
mrayner@lsls.fordham .edu
Lincoln Squar·e Legal Se1v ices
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62nd Street, 9th Floor
N ew York, New York 10023
(212) 636-6934
On the Reply:
Eli Salamon-Abrams
Isabel Zeitz-Moskin
Legal Interns

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-B
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I, Martha Rayner, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106, that the total
number of words in the foregoing Amended Petition, inclusive of point headings and footnotes
and exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature
block, is 4,166 words. The foregoing Affirmation in Reply complies with the word count limit set
forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing Memorandum
of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare the document.

/s/ Martha Rayner_______________
MARTHA RAYNER
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.
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